Mulamadyamakakarika, translated by Nancy McCagney, Nagarjuna and the Philosophy of Openness (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 137-218.
Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Oxford University Press, 1995). From the Tibetan translations of the Mulamadyamakakarika.
Dedication
I greet the best of teachers, that Awakened One, who taught liberation, the quieting of phenomena, interdependent origination which is nonceasing and nonarising, nonmomentary and nonpermanent, nonidentical and nondifferent, noncoming and nongoing.
Garfield: I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, the best of teachers, who taught that whatever is dependently arisen is unceasing, unborn, unannihilated, not permanent, not coming, not going, without distinction, without identity, and free from conceptual construction.
The Central Theme of the Carita
What is interdependent origination, that is called openness (shunyata)by us. It [openness] makes use of convention and is the practice of the middle way. (Chap. 24.18)
Garfield:
Whatever is dependently coarisen
That being explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation
is itself the middle way.
McCagney, chap. 1.1. Never, nowhere do any beings occur arisen from themselves, from others, from both or from no cause
Garfield: Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anything whatever, anywhere arise.
1.2 There are only four conditions,
namely cause, supporting condition,
contiguous condition and dominant
condition. There is no fifth condition.
Garfield: There are four condition: efficient condition; percept-object condition; immediate condition; dominant condition, just so. There is no fifth condition.
1.3 Indeed, no self-nature (own being, essence) of beings occurs in the conditions of beings. Since self-nature is not present, other nature does not occur.
Garfield: The essence of entities is not present in the conditions, etc. . . . If there is no essence, there can be no otherness-essence.
Burtt Anthology: In these conditions we can find no self-existence of entities. Where self-existence is deficient, relational existence also lacks.
1.4 Causal efficacy is not to be associated with conditions, causal efficacy is not associated with nonconditions, conditions are not associated with causal efficacy or noncausal efficacy.
1.5 What arises "depends" on these so-called conditions. So long as there is no arising, how are these not nonconditions?
1.6 Neither being nor nonbeing are associated with conditions of usefulness. Of what [use] are conditions of nonbeing? And to whom [is there use] in conditions for being?
1.7. Whenever an event that is existent, nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent does not originate, how can a cause that thus brings [events] about be reasonable?
1.8 This event that exists is described as without supporting condition. But where an event is without a supporting condition, again, why [talk of] of supporting condition?
1.9 When events do not arise, cessation does not happen. Hence what condition is suitable for a noncontiguous condition in cessation?
1.10 Since beings lacking self-nature do not occur as existence per se, this [statement] "when that is, this comes to be" does not obtain.
1.11 The effect is not in the conditions either separately or together. How could that which is not in the conditions be from the conditions?
1.12 Moreover, if the effect, nonexistent in those [conditions], is set in motion from those conditions, why is it not set in motion from no conditions?
1.13 The effect is created by conditions, but the conditions are not created by themselves. How can an effect created by conditions be from what is not created by itself?
1.14 The effect is created neither from conditions nor from no conditions. How can an effect be obtained from nonexistent conditions and no conditions?
Garfield (1.4-1.14):
1.4. Power to act does not have conditions. There is no power to act without conditions. There are no conditions without power to act. Nor do any have the power to act.
1.5. These give rise to those, so these are called conditions. As long as those do not come from these, why are these not nonconditions?
1.6. For neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing is a condition appropriate. If a thing is non-existent, how could it have a condition? If a thing is already existent, what would a condition do?
1.7. When neither existents nor nonexistents nor existent nonexistents are established, how could one propose a "productive cause?" If there were one, it would be pointless.
1.8. An existent entity (mental episode) has no object. Since a mental episode is with out an object, how could there be any percept-condition?
1.9. Since things are not arisen, cessation is not acceptable. Therefore, an immediate condition is not reasonable. If something has ceased, how could it be a condition?
1.10. If things did not exist without essence, the phrase "When this exists so this will be," would not be acceptable.
1.11. In the several or united conditions the effect cannot be found. How could something not in the conditions come from the conditions?
1.12. However, if a nonexistent effect arises from these conditions, why does it not arise from non-conditions?
1.13. If the effect's essence is the conditions, but the conditions don't have their own essence, how could an effect whose essence is the conditions come from something that is essenceless?
1.14. Therefore, neither with conditions as their es-sence, nor with nonconditions as their essence are there any effects. If there are no such effects, how could conditions or nonconditions be evident?
Chap. 25: Analysis of Nirvana
1. If all this is open (shunyata), there is neither arising nor passing away. Whose liberation is presupposed either through abandonment or through cessation?
2. If all this is not open, there is neither arising nor passing away. Whose freedom is presupposed either through abandonment or cessation?
3. What is not abandoned and not attained, not interrupted and not permanent, not destroyed and not produced, this is called Nirvana.
4. Firstly, Nirvana is not an existent characterized by old age and death. Indeed, no being is without old age and death.
5. If Nirvana is an existent, Nirvana would be conditioned. Not any unconditioned existent occurs anywhere.
6. If Nirvana is existent, how is it non-grasping? For not any nongrasping Nirvana occurs as existent.
7. If Nirvana is not existent, will Nirvana be nonexistent? Where there is no existent, there is no nonexistent.
8. If Nirvana is nonexistent, how is Nirvana not grasping it [existence]? Indeed, no nongrasping nonexistent occurs.
9. That state of moving restlessly to and fro [Samsara] is grasping and dependent. But Nirvana is taught as without grasping and without dependence.
10. The Teacher (Buddha) taught the abandonment of becoming and nonbecoming. Therefore, the assertion "Nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent" is reasonable.
Garfield (25.1-10)
25.1. If all this is empty, then there is no arising or passing away. By the relinquishing or ceasing of what does one wish Nirvana to arise?
25.2. If all this is nonempty, then there is no arising or passing away. By the relinquishing or ceasing of what does one wish Nirvana to arise?
25.3. Unrelinquished, unattained, unannihilated, not permanent, unarisen, uncaused: This is how Nirvana is described.
25.4. Nirvana is not existent. It would the have the characteristics of age and death. There is no existent entity without age and death.
25.5. If Nirvana were existent, Nirvana would be compounded. A noncompounded existent does not exist anywhere.
25.6. If Nirvana were existent, how could Nirvana be nondependent? A nondependent existent does not exist anywhere.
25.7. If Nirvana were not existent, how could it be appropriate for it to be nonexistent? Where Nirvana is not existent, it cannot be a nonexistent.
25.8. If Nirvana were not existent, how could Nirvana be nondependent? Whatever is nondependent is not nonexistent.
25.9. That which comes an goes is dependent and changing. That, when it is not dependent and changing, is taught to be Nirvana.
25.10. The teacher has spoken of relinquishing becoming and dissolution. Therefore, it makes sense that Nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent.
McCagney: 25.11. If Nirvana would be both existent and nonexistent, liberation would be both existent and nonexistent. But that is not reasonable.
12. If Nirvana would be both existent and nonexistent, Nirvana would not be nongrasping for both are grasping.
13. How could Nirvana be both existent and non-existent? Nirvana is unconditioned, and both existent and nonexistent are conditioned.
14. How could Nirvana be both existent and nonexistent? There is no existence of both, as with light and darkness, in the same place.
15. What is clear is the statement "Nirvana is not existent and not nonexistent." It is demonstrated where being and nonbeing are established as existing.
16. If Nirvana is known by neither existent nor nonexistent, can it be made clear by whom as "neither existent nor nonexistent"?
17. It is not maintained that "the Venerable One exists after death" nor is it maintained "he does not exist" or "both or neither."
18. It is not maintained that "the Venerable One exists while remaining in the world" nor is it maintained that "he does not exist or both or neither."
19. There is no distinction whatever between Samsara and Nirvana. There is no distinction whatever between Nirvana and Samsara.
20. The limit of Nirvana is that of Samsara. The subtlest difference is not found between the two.
Garfield 25.11-20:
11. If Nirvana were both existent and nonexistent, passing beyond would, impossibly, be both existent and nonexistent.
12. If Nirvana were both existent and nonexistent, Nirvana would not be nondependent. Since it would depend on both of these.
13. How could Nirvana be both existent and nonexistent? Nirvana is uncompounded. Both existents and nonexistents are compounded.
14. How could Nirvana be both existent and nonexistent? These cannot be in the same place. Like light and darkness.
15. Nirvana is said to be neither existent nor nonexistent. If the existent and the nonexistent were established, this would established.
16. If Nirvana is neither existent nor nonexistent, then by whom is it expounded "neither existent nor nonexistent"?
17. Having passed into Nirvana, the Victorious Conqueror is neither said to be existent nor said to be nonexistent. Neither both nor neither is said.
18. So, when the victorious one abides, he is neither said to be existent nor said to be nonexistent. Neither both or neither are said.
19. There is not the slightest difference between cyclic existence and Nirvana. There is not the slightest difference between Nirvana and cyclic existence.
20. Whatever is the limit of Nirvana, that is the limit of cyclic existence. There is not even the slightest difference between them, or even the subtlest thing.
McCagney 25.21-24:
21. Views, such as permanence, etc., finitude, etc., after death, are associated with a past and future Nirvana.
22. Since all events are open, what is infinite? What is finite? What is infinite and finite and what is neither infinite nor finite?
23. What has gone away? What identity? What difference? What is permanent and impermanent or neither and so forth?
24. Liberation is the cessation of all thought, the quieting of phenomena. Not any doctrine anywhere has been taught to anyone by the Buddha.
Garfield:
21. Views that after cessation there is a limit, etc., and that it is permanent, etc., depend upon Nirvana, the final limit, and the prior limit.
22. Since all existents are empty, what is finite or infinite? What is finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite?
23. What is identical and what is different? What is permanent and what is impermanent? What is both permanent and impermanent? What is neither?
24. The pacification of all objectification and the pacification of illusion: No Dharma was taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to any person.